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NEW CONSIDERATIONS UNDER THE EIGHTH
AMENDMENT'S EXCESSIVE FINES CLAUSE
WHEN DETERMINING CRIMINAL FORFEITURE
The Second Circuitallows latitude in imposing criminalforfeiture
by considering whether criminal forfeiture would deprive a convicted
defendant of a future ability to earn a living. This decision raises questions
whether it is proper for courts to ignore a defendant's personal
circumstances, such as age, health, and financial condition, when those
conditions may affect a defendant'sfuture ability to earn a living.

I. INTRODUCTION
A fundamental goal of prosecutions is to ensure wrongdoers are held
One avenue for holding defendants
accountable for their actions!
accountable is through incarceration.2 Another way is by ensuring that
defendants who are found guilty are deprived of the fruits of their illegal
acts .3 Essentially, forfeiture allows prosecutors to take defendants' profits
that are derived from their crimes.4

&

1 See Stefan D. Cassella, Asset Forfeiture Law in the United States, 1-2 (2007),
(discussing
http://assetforfeiturelaw.us/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Chapter-for-Colin-King.pdf
prosecution goals).
2 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (listing factors regarding imposing sentences). The factors to be
considered when imposing a sentence include: the conduct and totality of the circumstances
surrounding the crime, the defendant's prior propensity for wrongdoing, and the sentencing
purpose, including necessity for punishment, public protection or deterring from future acts of
similar nature. Id. The court shall also consider the "category of the offense" and relevant
guidelines. Id. "The court should impose a sentence that is sufficient, but not greater than
necessary." Id; see also Mark Osler, Must Have Got Lost: TraditionalSentencing Goals, the False
Trail of Uniformity and Process, and the Way Back Home, 54 S.C. L. REV. 649, 654 (2003)
(describing loss of traditional sentencing goals).
3 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (setting forth accused's rights in criminal prosecution); see also
Kaley v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1090, 1094 (2014) ("Criminal forfeitures are imposed upon
conviction to confiscate assets used in or gained from certain serious crimes."); United States v.
Alamoudi, 452 F.3d 310, 314 (4th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. McHan, 345 F.3d 262, 271
(4th Cir. 2003) (holding criminal forfeiture statute is not discretionary); Cassella, supra note 1, at
3 ("Prosecutors are often told, 'don't just put the defendant in jail; take away the fruits of the
crime.').
4 See Cassella, supranote 1, at 3 (describing goals of forfeiture); see also Sarah N. Welling
Jane Lyle Hord, Friction in Reconciling Criminal Forfeiture and Bankruptcy: The Criminal
ForfeiturePart, 42 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REv. 551, 551 (2012) (contending "forfeiture is basically
another part of the sentence rather than a separate charge in itself.").
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Criminal forfeiture statutes permit the government to confiscate
property derived from, or used to, facilitate criminal activity.5 Such statutes
serve several critical governmental interests including "separating a criminal
from his ill-gotten gains," "returning property, in full, to those wrongfully
deprived or defrauded of it," and "lessen[ing] the economic power" of
criminal organizations .6
The Supreme Court of the United States analyzed whether criminal
forfeiture statutes violate the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause.'
Forfeiture of a defendant's money is limited by the Excessive Fines Clause,
which curtails unduly burdensome punishment.'
Punishment is the
"intentional imposition of some deprivation or suffering on individuals
against their wills." 9 The Supreme Court held that forfeiture used as
punishment violates the Excessive Fines Clause if the forfeiture is
disproportional to the gravity of the defendant's criminal offense.10 The
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently took the
Supreme Court's holding a step further by acknowledging an additional
factor that is relevant when determining the constitutionality of forfeiture."
The Second Circuit held that courts should also consider whether forfeiture
would be depriving a convicted defendant of a future ability to earn a living .12
Under federal law, the government can seize property by: (1)
administrative forfeiture; (2) civil forfeiture; or (3) criminal forfeiture.1 3
Administrative forfeitures permit certain federal agencies to take an

5 See Honeycutt v. U.S., 137 S. Ct. 1626, 1631 (2017) (describing criminal forfeiture statutes
fundamental purpose).
6 See id. (citing Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 629-30 (1989))
(enumerating purposes of criminal forfeiture statutes).
7 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 326-28 (1998) (analyzing whether
Bajakajian's failure to declare money would violate Excessive Fines Clause).
8 See id. at 334 (clarifying forfeiture constitutes punishment).
9 See Don E. Scheid, Constructing a Theory of Punishment, Desert, and the Distribution of
Punishments, 10 CAN. J.L. & JuRIs. 441,441 (1997) (defining punishment).
10 See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 324 (stating holding regarding forfeiture issue).
11 See United States v. Viloski, 814 F.3d 104, 114-15 (2d Cir. 2016) (outlining further
considerations of criminal forfeiture determinations).
12 See id. (reviewing whether forfeiture would deprive defendant of his livelihood).
13 See Cassella, supra note 1, at 9-15 (explaining how government can seize property). Most
federal forfeitures are uncontested administrative forfeitures. Id. Certain federal law enforcement
agencies are authorized to seize property based on probable cause during an investigation. Id. On
the other hand, civil forfeitures are not part of a criminal case, but are separate civil actions in rem
against property and based on a preponderance of the evidence the property was derived from or
used to commit a crime. Id. Unlike criminal forfeiture, civil forfeitures do not rely on guilty verdicts
and may be filed even in the absence of a criminal case. Id.
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individual's property without a judicial process.1 4 Merchandise that is barred
from import, conveyance used to import, transport or store drugs, and a
monetary instrument or other property under $500,000, may all be subject to
administrative forfeiture." On the other hand, civil forfeitures are actions
brought in judicial proceedings.16 Civil judicial forfeitures are referred to as
in rem action, meaning the action is brought against the property." However,
criminal forfeitures are most relevant to the restrictions of the Excessive
Fines Clause because criminal forfeitures are part of an action brought under
a criminal prosecution.'" Criminal forfeiture is considered an in personam
action, which requires the government to indict the property used or derived
from the crime, and also to indict a person for the crime.1 9 If a jury
determines the property is forfeiture, the court will issue an order of

14 See 19 U.S.C. § 1607 (outlining administrative forfeiture); see also U.S.DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
TYPES OF FEDERAL FORFEITURE, (Feb. 1, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/afp/types-federalforfeiture (setting forth types of federal forfeitures).
5 See

U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TYPES OF FEDERAL FORFEITURE,

(Feb.

1, 2017),

forfeiture
administrative
(discussing
https://www.justice.gov/afp/types-federal-forfeiture
guidelines).
16 See id. (discussing civil judicial forfeitures).
'7 See Cassella, supra note 1, at 11 (explaining concept of in rem forfeitures).
" See 28 U.S.C. § 2461(c) (proscribing modes of recovery for government in forfeiture
action). The modes of recovery are prescribed as:
If a person is charged in a criminal case with a violation of an Act of Congress for which
the civil or criminal forfeiture of property is authorized, the Government may include
notice of the forfeiture in the indictment or information pursuant to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. If the defendant is convicted of the offense giving rise to the
forfeiture, the court shall order the forfeiture of the property as part of the sentence in
the criminal case pursuant to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and section 3554
of title 18, United States Code. The procedures in section 413 of the Controlled
Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 853) apply to all stages of a criminal forfeiture proceeding,
except that subsection (d) of such section applies only in cases in which the defendant is
convicted of a violation of such Act.
Id. See also U.S.

DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TYPES OF FEDERAL FORFEITURE, (Feb.

1, 2017),

https://www.justice.gov/afp/types-federal-forfeiture (describing types of federal forfeitures).
'9 See United States v. Jalaram, 599 F.3d 347, 352-53 (4th Cir. 2010) (meeting threshold
requirement of Eighth Amendment); see also United States v. Vampire Nation, 451 F.3d 189, 202
(3d Cir. 2006) (limiting "in personam judgment in forfeiture is more limited than a general
judgment in personam"). See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, TYPES OF FEDERAL FORFEITURE, (Feb. 1,

2017), https://www.justice.gov/afp/types-federal-forfeiture (discussing criminal forfeiture). The
term in personam means against the person. Id. "Forfeitures pursuant to the Controlled Substance
Act (CSA), Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO), as well as money laundering
and obscenity statutes, there is an ancillary hearing for third parties to assert their interest in the
property." Id. The court then issues a forfeiture order. Id.
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forfeiture. 20 Forfeiture in a criminal case is considered a punishment.2 1
Forfeiture in criminal cases can also only occur if the defendant is convicted
of certain enumerated offenses .22
The applicability of criminal forfeiture is constrained by the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution. 23 This provision is referred
to as the Excessive Fines Clause and it explicitly prohibits excessive fines .24
The Excessive Fines Clause limits the government's power to extract
payments as punishment for a criminal offense, but it is up to courts to
determine what is considered excessive. 25 Although the Eighth Amendment
may apply to civil proceedings, its application has frequently been used in
criminal cases .26 Furthermore, when a person is convicted of certain
20 See FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.2(b)(1)(A) (noting orders of forfeiture).
determined in the following manner during the forfeiture phase of the trial:

Forfeiture should be

As soon as practical after a verdict or finding of guilty, or after a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere is accepted, on any count in an indictment or information regarding which
criminal forfeiture is sought, the court must determine what property is subject to
forfeiture under the applicable statute. If the government seeks forfeiture of specific
property, the court must determine whether the government has established the requisite
nexus between the property and the offense. If the government seeks a personal money
judgment, the court must determine the amount of money that the defendant will be
ordered to pay.
Id. See Cassella,supra note 1, at 14 (discussing forfeiture). Forfeiture is determined after the
defendant is found guilty. Id. Once the defendant is found guilty, the court hears additional
arguments and evidence at the sentencing phase, and if the government establishes the requisite
nexus between the property and the crime, the defendant will be ordered by the court to forfeit the
property derived from or used for the crime. Id.
21 See Libretti v. United States, 516 U.S. 29, 39 (1995) (reviewing
precedent characterizing
criminal forfeiture as punishment); see also Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 558-59
(1993) (determining monetary punishment no different from traditional fine for Eighth Amendment
purposes); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vermont, Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 263-64
(1989) (determining Excessive Fines Clause does not bar monetary award in civil lawsuit); United
States v. Leahy, 438 F.3d 328, 333-34 (3d Cir. 2006) (stating restitution combines both criminal
and civil penalties).
22 See United States v. Nava, 404 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2005)
(distinguishing defendant's
forfeiture interests from innocent party's property); see also United States v. Ginsburg, 773 F.2d
798, 800 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating "government's interest in the property does not attach until the
time of the defendant's conviction of the crime."); United States v. King, 231 F. Supp. 3d 872, 889
(W.D. Okla. 2017) (highlighting foreseeability requirement regarding joint liability).
23 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIH. ("Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted."); see also United States v. Bajakajian, 524
U.S. 321, 327-28 (1998) (conducting Eighth Amendment analysis for forfeiture).
24 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. (defining Excessive Fines Clause);
see also Bajakajian,524
at 327-28 (providing further context to Excessive Fines Clause).
25 See Cassella, supra note 1, at 8 (explaining limits on
government to impose excessive
forfeiture).
26 See Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 606-07 (1993) (suggesting
reach sometimes
extends beyond criminal cases).
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statutory offenses, the court shall order the forfeiture of "any property, real
or personal, involved in such offense, or any property traceable to such
property."" Such offenses include federal program fraud, mail fraud, and
2
wire fraud. 8

II. HISTORY
Courts began interpreting the Eighth Amendment by analyzing
issues dealing with cruel and unusual punishment, including the
29
Around the beginning of
constitutionality of imposing the death penalty.
the twentieth century, courts formulated a view that the language of the
Eighth Amendment not only protects citizens against cruel and unusual
punishment, but also "against all punishments which by their excessive
0
length or severity are greatly disproportioned to the offences charged."
When the Eighth Amendment was drafted, the word "fines" was
defined as a payment to a sovereign as punishment for an offense, and
31
punitive damages were frequently awarded. Courts have since interpreted
the Excessive Fines Clause to suggest it does not apply to civil punitive
32
In effect, the
damages, but applies to bail, fines, and other punishments.

See 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (explaining forfeiture of property).
See 18 U.S.C. § 982(3) (outlining applicable offenses).
29 See Commonwealth v. 1997 Chevrolet & Contents Seized From James Young, 160 A.3d
153, 163 (Pa. 2017) (acknowledging cruel and unusual punishment discussion). "While the 'cruel
and unusual punishment' clause has generated a significant amount of litigation, the United States
Supreme Court has interpreted the Excessive Fines Clause only on rare occasions, and, for many
years, that Clause with respect to civil in rem forfeitures went unexplored." Id.; see also 1-4
William H. Erickson, B.J. George, Jr., & Timothy M. Tymkovich, UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT CASES AND COMMENTS: CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE, ¶ 4.02 (Matthew Bender)
(describing early cases involving Eighth Amendment).
30 See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 102 (1976) (quoting Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F. 2d 571,
579 (8th Cir. 1968)) (outlining purpose behind Eighth Amendment). "Amendment proscribes more
than physically barbarous punishments . ... The Amendment embodies 'broad and idealistic
concepts of dignity, civilized standards, humanity, and decency . . . .' Id. (citations omitted);
O'Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1892) (Field, J., dissenting) (expanding view of Eighth
Amendment); Erickson, supra note 29, at ¶ 4.02 (commenting on change in Court's views).
31 See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 265 (1989) (describing
framers' intent of Eighth Amendment); see also Meghan J. Ryan, Does the Eighth Amendment
Punishments Clause Prohibit Only Punishments That Are Both Cruel and Unusual?, 87 WASH. U.
L. REv. 567, 574 (2010) (explaining origin of Eighth Amendment). Scholars believe the Eighth
Amendment was modeled from the 1776 Virginia Declaration of Rights, which states, "that
excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
27

28

punishments inflicted." Id.
32 See Browning-Ferris Indus., 492 U.S. at 262 (applying Eighth Amendment primarily to
criminal prosecutions and punishments).
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Excessive Fines Clause limits the government's power to order defendants
to make payments as punishment for their criminal offenses .3
The Excessive Fines Clause was not discussed much by the First
Congress during the ratification of the Bill of Rights .3 However, the
Excessive Fines Clause was taken precisely from the English Bill of Rights
of 1689.31 The clause was incorporated into the English Bill of Rights to
protect people from the power of the King's judges during the reign of the
Stuarts. 36 The English constitutional tradition, including the Magna Carta,
provided that a fine "should not deprive a wrongdoer of his livelihood."37
However, the historical versions of the Excessive Fines Clause do not
suggest how disproportional the fine must be to the offense to be in violation
of the Constitution. 38
It took courts some time to address whether civil forfeitures under
21 U.S.C. § 881 are considered punishment. 39 To address that issue, the court
needed to be mindful of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth
Amendment, which prohibits individuals from being "subject for the same
offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb."40 Ultimately, double
jeopardy does not apply if a defendant is ordered to pay both restitution and
criminal forfeiture.4 1
3 See United States v. Delgado, 959 F. Supp. 1523, 1527 (S.D. Fla. 1997) (holding forfeiture
violates Eighth Amendment if "excessive"); see also Eric C. Surette, Annotation, When Does
Forfeiture of Currency, Bank Acco'unt, or Cash Equivalent Violate Excessive Fines Clause of
Eighth Amendment, 164 A.L.R. FED. 591, 2 (stating limits of forfeiture).
34 See United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 335 (1998) (citing Browning-FerrisIndus.,
492 U.S. at 266-67) (discussing history of Excessive Fines Clause).
35 See id. (recognizing overlap with English Bill of Rights); see also Andrew M. Kenefick,
Note, The Constitutionalityof Punitive Damages Under the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth
Amendment, 85 MICH. L. REv. 1699, 1714 (1987) (addressing influence English Bill of Rights had
on Excessive Fines Clause).
36 See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 335 (noting English Bill of Rights extends back to Magna
Carta). In reviewing the Magna Carta, the Court quoted:
A Free-man shall not be amerced for a small fault, but after the manner of the fault; and
for a great fault after the greatness thereof, saving to him his contenement; (2) and a
Merchant likewise, saving to him his merchandise; (3) and any other's villain than ours
shall be likewise amerced, saving his wainage.
Id. at 335-36 (quoting Magna Charta, 9 Hen. U, ch. 14 (1225), 1 Stat. at Large 6-7 (1762 ed.)).
3 See id. (explaining relevance of Magna Carta provisions); see also Browning-FerrisIndus.,
492 U.S. at 288 (proscribing Magna Carta's requirement that payment not be large enough to
deprive individual of livelihood).
38 See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 335 (discussing various versions of Excessive Fines Clause).
39 See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a) (defining civil forfeiture); see also Austin v. United States, 509 U.S.
602, 619 (1993) (expanding definition of punishment).
40 See U.S. CONST. amend. V (explaining double jeopardy).
41 See United States v. McGinty, 610 F.3d 1242, 1247-48 (10th Cir. 2010) (explaining why
criminal forfeiture and restitution are separate remedies).
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Courts have allowed multiple punishments if the legislature
authorizes it and the punishments have two separate attributes.42 The
Supreme Court in United States v. Ursery4 3 held that the property is the
subject of a traditional in rem forfeiture proceeding, whereas in a criminal
prosecution the individual is proceeded against." The Double Jeopardy
Clause only applies in criminal proceedings and where the forfeiture is
intended as punishment.45 Whereas, to make the determination whether an
in rem civil forfeiture is punishment, courts should first look to Congress'
intent in enacting the forfeiture statute, and then to whether the proceedings
are punitive in nature.4 6
There are numerous statutes authorizing civil forfeiture in a variety
of criminal contexts, but 21 U.S.C. § 881 is commonly considered the
"centerpiece" of those statutes.47 Section 881 is the civil drug forfeiture
statute that authorizes the government to combine conveyance, asset and real
property forfeitures, and may give the government authority to seize all of
an individual's property.4 8 Legislatures enacted such criminal forfeiture

Because restitution and forfeiture are distinct remedies, ordering both in the same or
similar amounts does not generally amount to a double recovery . .. .[P]aying restitution
plus forfeiture at worst forces the offender to disgorge a total amount equal to twice the
value of the proceeds of the crime. Given the many tangible and intangible costs of
criminal activity, this is in no way disproportionate to the harm inflicted upon
government and society by the offense.
Id. (internal citations omitted) (first citing United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 793 n.8 (7th Cir.
2006); then quoting United States v. Emerson, 128 F.3d 557, 567 (7th Cir. 1997)).
42 See Amy D. Ronner, Prometheus Unbound: Accepting a Mythless Concept of Civil In Rem
Forfeiture With Double Jeopardy Protection, 44 BUFF. L. REv. 655, 666 (1996) (explaining how
courts have permitted double remedy).
43 518 U.S. 267 (1996).
4 See id. at 275 (explaining in rem forfeiture).
[This] forfeiture proceeding . . . is in rem. It is the property which is proceeded against,
and, by resort to a legal fiction, held guilty and condemned as though it were conscious
instead of inanimate and insentient. In a criminal prosecution it is the wrongdoer in
person who is proceeded against, convicted, and punished. The forfeiture is no part of
the punishmentfor the criminal offense. The provision of the Fifth Amendment to the
Constitutionin respectof double jeopardy does not apply.
Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Various Items of Personal Property v. United States, 282 U.S. 577,
581 (1931)).
45 See id. at 277 (explaining limitation on application of double jeopardy).
46 See id. at 288 (describing two steps to analyze civil forfeitures).
47 See id. (discussing civil forfeiture status and their application); see also Ronner, supra note
42, at 658 (categorizing 21 U.S.C. § 881 as centerpiece).
48 See Ronner, supra note 42, at 658 (explaining origin of 21 U.S.C. § 881). The statute was
enacted under the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970 and authorized
drug forfeiture or any property used in drug trafficking. Id. at 673. The statute was later amended
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statutes to prevent prosecutorial overreach and to protect defendants'
constitutional rights." Prosecutorial overreach includes targeting certain
defendants or classes of defendants.s0
Since Eighth Amendment protections were traditionally focused
around punishment, courts were interpreting the amendment to only apply to
criminal proceedings." Furthermore, 21 U.S.C. § 881 was traditionally used
as a forfeiture vehicle for civil proceedings.5 2 Around the 1970s, Congress
began implementing statutes that authorized asset forfeiture for certain
statutory offenses.5 The legislative goals of these statutes were to have
measures to seize money or property that someone obtained in an illegal way
and to deter future crimes.54
Then in Austin v. United States," the Supreme Court addressed
whether the Excessive Fines Clause applies to property forfeitures and the
result became an important decision for future criminal forfeiture cases .56
The Supreme Court was not concerned whether forfeiture under a federal
statute was criminal or civil, but was trying to understand at the time the
Eighth Amendment was ratified, if forfeiture was understood in part as
punishment and whether forfeiture should still apply as punishment in

to authorize the forfeiture of proceeds traceable to drug deals, including money and negotiable
instruments. Id. The Senate Report on the 1978 Amendment described the amended statute as
"penal in nature." Id. It was clear that the legislature intended the statute to act as a deterrent for
drug crimes. Id.
49 See Brynn Applebaum, Note, Criminal Asset Forfeiture and the Sixth Amendment After
Southern Union and Alleyne: State-Level Ramifications, 68 VAND. L. REV. 549, 553 (2015)
(exploring concerns with modem criminal forfeiture statutes).
5o See Daniel Epps, AdversarialAsymmetry in the CriminalProcess, 91 N.Y.U. L. REv. 762,
768 (2016) (describing targeted prosecution as form of prosecutorial overreach).
51 See United States v. 1912 S.E. 15th Ave. Gainesville Fla., No. 1:06-cv-00138-MP-AK, 2010
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 52714, at *5 (N.D. Fla. May 25, 2010) (considering Excessive Fines Clause of
Eighth Amendment traditionally focused on criminal cases).
52 See id. (considering forfeiture under federal forfeiture statute applies primarily to civil
proceedings).
s3 See Michele M. Jochner, The U.S. Supreme Court Expands Excessive Fines Clause
Protectionin Austin and Bajakajian,87 ILL. B.J. 78, 79 (1999) (explaining Congress' reach).
54 See id. (discussing legislative goals).
's 509 U.S. 602 (1993).
56 See id. at 604 (figuring out reach of Excessive Fines Clause). Civil proceedings could have
both punitive and remedial goals, so the question was not whether forfeiture is civil or criminal, but
whether forfeiture is instituted as a form of punishment. Id. at 610. Sanctions can have more than
one purpose. Id. The government argued forfeitures from drug offenses are remedial because: (1)
they remove the instruments of the drug trade to protect the public from the detriment of drug
dealing and (2) forfeited assets compensate the government for money spent on law enforcement
activity and other societal problems. Id. at 620. The Court disagreed, holding the forfeiture was
punishment, in part because Congress also felt fines and imprisonment are not strong enough
deterrents to stop the profits individuals can make in drug crimes. Id. at 621.
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present day.5 7 The Supreme Court in Austin categorized forfeiture as
punishment after examining legislative history.5 The Court reasoned that
"civil sanction that cannot fairly be said solely to serve a remedial purpose,
but rather can only be explained as also serving either retributive or deterrent
9
The
purposes, is punishment, as we have come to understand the term."
Court continued its reasoning that forfeiture is not solely remedial because
of its historical use, statutory language, and Congress' intent to deter and
punish.'
In dealing with the Eighth Amendment Excessive Fines Clause as it
applies to in rem civil forfeiture proceedings, Austin shaped the outer limits
of the application of the Excessive Fines Clause. 1 In effect, the decision was
the first major case to expand the reach of the Excessive Fines Clause and
would begin a trend of similar future cases.62 However, the Austin Court
declined to establish a multi-factor test to determine when forfeiture is
"excessive" under the Eighth Amendment.
The Supreme Court did not interpret the Excessive Fines Clause of
the Eighth Amendment for two centuries.' Then in United States v.
Bajakajian,6 the Supreme Court expanded the reach of the Excessive Fines
Clause and created precedent for individuals to challenge imposed fines.66
In Bajakajian, the defendant violated federal law by attempting to travel
outside of the United States without reporting the full amount of money with
which he was traveling. 67 Federal law prohibited transporting more than
$10,000 out of the country without reporting the money to customs

5

See Erickson, supra note 29, at T 4.02 (describing importance of Austin).

58 See Austin, 509 U.S. at 619 (considering forfeiture as punishment).

59 See id. at 621 (quoting United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 439, 448 (1989)) (explaining
reasoning for holding forfeiture constitutes punishment).
60 See id. at 621-22 (explaining why forfeiture is subject to Eighth Amendment limitations).
61 See id. at 608-09 (expanding scope of Excessive Fines Clause).
62 See Jochner, supra note 53, at 78 (pointing to impact of Austin on future cases).
63 See Austin, 509 U.S. at 622 (declining to establish test for determining whether forfeiture is
constitutionally "excessive"); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 538 (1992) (allowing lower
courts to address establishing test).
6 See Beth A. Colgan et al., Reviving the Excessive Fines Clause, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 277,
297 (2014) (commenting on gap in time between ratification of Excessive Fines Clause and
analysis).
65 524 U.S. 321 (1998).
66 See Jochner, supra note 53, at 78 (discussing impact on Excessive Fines Clause).
67 See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 324 (discussing facts of case). Bajakajian attempted to leave
the country without reporting over $10,000. Id. The government charged Bajakajian with failing
to report, making a false material statement to the United States Customs Services, and a third count
that sought forfeiture of the money. Id. at 325. Bajakajian pled guilty to the failure to report charge,
the false statement charge was dropped, and the forfeiture matter proceeded to trial. Id.
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officials.68 Despite the customs officials' warning, Bajakajian stated he and
his family were carrying less than the reportable amount.6 9
The issue before the Court was whether forfeiture of the entire
amount violated the Excessive Fines Clause. 0 Although the district court
held that the entire amount was subject to forfeiture because it was "involved
in" the offense, the Court only ordered the defendant to forfeit a portion of
the money." The Court reasoned the full forfeiture would be grossly
disproportional to the offense and therefore would violate the Eighth
Amendment.7 2
In Bajakajian, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that forfeiture must fulfill two
conditions: (1) the forfeited property "must be an 'instrumentality' of the
crime committed" and (2) the property's value "must be proportional to the
culpability of the owner."7 3 For the first time, the Court developed a standard
for determining whether a punitive forfeiture is constitutionally excessive. 74
The Court held that a punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines Clause
if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of the offense that it is designed
to punish.75

The principle of proportionality is the key consideration to
determine whether a criminal forfeiture is constitutional.7 6 Accordingly, the
amount of the forfeiture must relate to the gravity of the offense that it is
designed to punish.77 In Bajakajian, the Court did not define gross
68 See 31 U.S.C. § 5316(a) (stating reporting requirements); see also Charmin Bortz Shiely,
United States v. Bajakajian: Will a New Standardfor Applying the Excessive Fines Clause to
Criminal Forfeitures Affect Civil Forfeiture Analysis?, 77 N.C.L. REV. 1595, 1598 (1999)
(applying laws to Bajakajian's actions).
69 See Charmin, supra note 68, at 1598 (describing details of case). Before seizing the
currency, officials searched the defendant's wallets and carry-on bags. Id. at 1599. A federal grand
jury indicted Bajakajian for failure to report the money, making a false material statement to the
United States Customs Service, and forfeiture of the total amount involved in violating the reporting
requirement. Id.
70 See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 324 (analyzing amount of forfeiture under Excessive Fines
Clause).
n See id. at 325-26 (explaining district court's forfeiture holding).
72 See id. at 326 (describing ruling of district court).
73 See Bajakajian,524 U.S. at 326 (reasoning for holding); see also United States v. Ferro, 681
F.3d 1105, 1111 (9th Cir. 2012) (defining instrumentality as "actual means by which an offense
was committed.").
74 See Viloski, 814 F.3d at 108-09 (discussing Supreme Court's application of Excessive Fines
Clause).
75 See Bajakajian,524 U.S. at 324 (requiring forfeiture weighed against gravity of defendant's
offense).
76 See id. at 334 (finding full forfeiture of defendant's currency would be grossly
disproportional to offense) (citing Austin v. United States, 509 US. 602,622-23 (1993)).
7 See Austin, 509 U.S. at 622-23 (discussing high penalty for offense committed).
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disproportionality, but rather through its reasoning, identified four factors
that should be considered to determine whether forfeiture is grossly
disproportional.78 The four factors are as follows:
(1) the essence of the crime of the defendant and its relation
to other criminal activity, (2) whether the defendant fits into
the class of persons for whom the statute was principally
designed, (3) the maximum sentence and fine that could
have been imposed, and (4) the nature of the harm caused
by the defendant's conduct.79
The decision in Bajakajianhas potential implications beyond cases
In Justice Kennedy's dissent, he stated that
involving forfeiture.so
Bajakajian may be a "serious disruption of a vast range of statutory fines.""
The four-factor test would ultimately lay the groundwork and form the
majority of the Second Circuit's analysis in Viloski which took its analysis
further. 82

11l. FACTS
The broad issue before the Viloski court was whether the criminal
forfeiture violated the defendant's rights under the Excessive Fines Clause
The jury convicted the defendant of
of the Eighth Amendment.13
participating in a kickback scheme involving the construction of sporting
goods stores.8 4 The defendant was sentenced to five years in prison and a
three-year term of supervised release .8 He was additionally ordered to pay
See Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 337-39 (applying principles of forfeiture laws to facts of case);
see also Viloski, 814 F3d at 110 (quoting United States v. George, 779 F.3d 113, 122 (2d Cir.
2015)) (outlining four-factor test).
7
See Viloski, 814 F.3d at 110 (quoting George, 779 F.3d at 122) (stating four factors).
80 See Jochner, supra note 53, at 78 (recognizing impact of United States v. Bajakajian on
Excessive Fines Clause).
81 See id. (expanding impact of decision); Bajakajian,524 U.S. at 344 (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(commenting on decision precedent).
82 See Viloski, 814 F3d at 115 (citing Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 324) (applying four factors to
conclude forfeiture not grossly disproportional).
83 See id. at 107 (outlining main question).
84 See id. (stating resolution of case). As a broker for Dick's Sporting Goods, the defendant
took payments for consulting fees from developers and landlords in exchange for work never
executed. Id. He would then either a portion or all of these payments to a senior Dick's Sporting
Goods executive. Id.
85 See id. (describing Viloski's court orders)
78

Viloski was charged in a twenty-count indictment related to these activities. After a
three-week trial, a jury convicted him of one count of conspiracy to commit mail and
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$75,000 to two victims and forfeit about $1.2 million that he acquired
through money laundering.8 6 The defendant appealed his conviction,
arguing the lower court erred by failing to consider personal circumstances
like age, health, and financial situation when determining whether the $1.2
million forfeiture was unconstitutionally excessive.1 7
The defendant based his opposition on three grounds." First, he
argued that his sixty-month sentence was decided from an "incorrectlycalculated Guidelines range," and inconsistent to the forty-one-month
sentence imposed on a co-defendant. 89 Second, he argued that the restitution
was awarded to entities that suffered "no cognizable loss."9 The defendant's
final argument was that there was not an adequate explanation for the
"enormous" forfeiture which violated his constitutional rights under the
Excessive Fines Clause.91 The court reviewed his claims for clear error and
found that the sentencing judge is only required to make a reasonable
estimate of the loss and held the sentence was substantially below the
guidelines because "the loss amount was greater than the actual harm
caused."92 The court then reviewed the forfeiture order de novo and the
factual findings for clear error. 93 The court held that:
While property need not be personally or directly in the
possession of the defendant, his assignees, or his coconspirators in order to be subject to forfeiture, the property
must have, at some point, been under the defendant's control
wire fraud, two substantive counts of mail fraud, one count of conspiracy to commit
money laundering, three counts of aiding and abetting money laundering, one count of
aiding and abetting transactions in criminally derived property, and one count of making
false statements. He was acquitted on the remaining counts.
Id.; See generally United States v. Phillips, 704 F.3d 754,762 n.7 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing mail
fraud). To be convicted of mail fraud, the prosecution must prove the defendant devised a scheme
for obtaining money or property by false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises for
the purpose of executing such scheme. Id.
86 See Viloski, 814 F3d at 107-08 (describing monetary portion of sentence). See generally
United States v. Hunter, 618 F.3d 1062, 1064 (9th Cir. 2010) (describing difference between
restitution and criminal forfeiture). "The purpose of restitution .. . however, is not to punish the
defendant, but to make the victim whole again by restoring to him or her the value of the losses
suffered as a result of the defendant's crime." Id. (citing United States v. Crandall, 525 F.3d 907,
916 (9th Cir. 2008)).
87 See Viloski, 814 F3d at 107 (explaining defendant's appeal arguments).
88 See United States v. Viloski, 557 F. App'x 28, 35 (2d Cir. 2014) (explaining defendant's
arguments in opposition to his sentence).
89 See id. (providing defendant's arguments against improper sentence).
90 See id. (describing lack of significant damage on rest of entities).
91 See id. (outlining defendant's constitutionality argument).
92 See id. at 36 (explaining court's rationale).
93 See Viloski, 557 F. App'x at 36 (stating court's standard of review).
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or the control of his coconspirators in order to be considered
"acquired" by him.94
The Second Circuit reviewed the case and relied on Bajakajian to
95
First, the court
analyze the constitutionality of the criminal forfeiture.
6
determined that the Excessive Fines Clause applied.9 The Excessive Fines
Clause applied because the forfeiture was a punitive damage that was linked
to the offenses. 97 The court subsequently evaluated whether the criminal
98
This
forfeiture of Viloski's money was unconstitutionally excessive.
inquiry required determining whether the Bajakajian factors constituted a
comprehensive list of factors required for the proportionality analysis
because the courts that have applied Bajakajianhave "neither added to the
four factors nor described them as comprehensive." 99 After answering this
question affirmatively, the Viloski court added a fifth factor to consider when
determining the proportionality of forfeiture under the Excessive Fines
Clause.t" The fifth factor was whether the forfeiture would deprive the
defendant of his livelihood and future ability to earn a living.10 1
The court carefully distinguished determining whether a forfeiture
would deprive the defendant of his livelihood from considering how
forfeiture would affect a defendant's personal circumstances, including age,
health, and financial situation. 10 2 Ultimately, the court determined that
whether the forfeiture would deprive the defendant of his livelihood is a
94 See id. (quoting United States v. Contorinis, 692 F.3d 136, 147 (2d Cir. 2012)) (detailing
requirements for property to be subject to forfeiture).
9 See Viloski, 814 F3d at 108 (discussing reliance on Bajakajian).
96 See id. at 109 (discussing courts application of Excessive Fines Clause); see also United
States v. An Antique Platter of Gold, 184 F.3d 131, 139 (2d Cir. 1999) ("[T]he fine was imposed
at the culmination of a criminal proceeding that required a conviction of the underlying felony and
could not have been imposed upon an innocent party.").
97 See Viloski, 814 F3d at 109 (explaining why Excessive Fines Clause applied).
98 See id. at 110 (pointing to court's next focus); see also United States v. King, 231 F. Supp.
3d 872, 899-90 (W.D. Okla. 2017) (applying Excessive Fines Clause and testing for
disproportionality).
99 See Viloski, 814 F3d at 110 (recognizing principal issue was whether factors are
exhaustive); see also United States v. George, 779 F.3d 113, 122-23 (2d Cir. 2015) (applying four
factors to proportionality assessment of challenged criminal forfeiture); United States v. Robbins,
No. 1:10-cr-268, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 59423, at *11 (W.D.N.Y. May 6, 2015) (utilizing
Bajakajian factors to determine forfeiture proportionality); United States v. 300 Blue Heron Farm
Lane, 115 F. Supp. 2d 525,528 (D. Md. 2000) (noting lower courts consider Bajakajianfactors in
determining whether forfeiture is grossly disproportional to offense).
100 See Viloski, 814 F.3d at 111 (concluding courts may also consider whether forfeiture would
deprive defendant of his livelihood).
1ot See id. (stressing impact of likelihood factor in analysis). The consideration of the fifth
factor is not a separate inquiry, but an inquiry that may be conducted within the proportionality
analysis already mandated by the Supreme Court in Bajakajian.Id.
102 See id. at 112 (distinguishing livelihood from "present personal circumstances").
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relevant factor for the proportionality analysis.103
The court also
acknowledged that the judiciary's role is to evaluate the constitutionality of
punishment, while the legislature's role is to determine the appropriate
punishment for criminal offenses." Finally, after recognizing that personal
circumstances, like age, health, and financial situation might indirectly affect
someone's ability to earn a living, the court stressed that personal
circumstances are not a separate and freestanding factor.'o
The Second Circuit applied the traditional Bajakajian four-factor
test to Viloski's conviction.'0 6 When applying the first factor, the court
considered the nature of the defendant's crime and its relation to other illicit
conduct, and concluded that the defendant engaged in a multi-year
conspiracy involving numerous financial offenses and fraudulent acts .o'
The court distinguished the defendant's involvement in a continuing
conspiracy from a crime arising out of a single event or transaction, such as
Bajakajian's failure to report money.' Viloski acted as a consultant for
numerous real estate transactions, in which he accepted a consulting fee, a
part of which was passed on to an employee of the sporting goods store, who
was also indicted. 09
Next, the court determined that Viloski fell within the class of
persons the statute was intended to punish." 0 The court reasoned that Viloski
was convicted of violating statutes that were created to punish "those who
use facilities of interstate or foreign commerce to engage in fraudulent
schemes and financial transactions" and subsequently attempted to conceal
the ill-gotten gains."' The court proceeded to scrutinize the maximum
sentence and fine that could be imposed for Viloski's offenses under the
Sentencing Guidelines and concluded the harsh punishments permitted by
the Guidelines suggest considerable culpability and therefore, indicate that
the forfeiture was likely constitutional.1 2 The Sentencing Guidelines call for
Viloski to serve 108 to 135 months in prison and pay a fine up to $500,000."1
See id. at 111 (adding fifth factor to proportionality test).
See id. at 112 (recognizing court's role is not to decide whether punishment is appropriate
for particular offense).
10s See Viloski, 814 F.3d at 113 (deeming personal circumstances to be "indirectly relevant to
a proportionality determination").
106 See id. (outlining Bajakajian factors required for analysis).
107 See id. (describing defendant's crime).
10
See id. (explaining defendant's willful participation in ongoing scheme).
109 See Viloski, 557 F. App'x at 31 (describing fraudulent money transfers).
110 See Viloski, 814 F.3d at 114 (stating second step in proportionality determination).
"'
See id. (explaining purpose of statutes at issue).
112 See id. (comparing statutory guidelines with Viloski's crimes).
"
See id. (summarizing Sentencing Guidelines applicable to Viloski's crimes). The statutory
maximum fine for such offenses is $3,250,000, which is more than two-and-a-half times the
103
104
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The court then considered the nature of the harm that Viloski's
conduct caused.1 1 4 The court felt comfortable imposing severe penalties
because Viloski's scheme to defraud caused "extensive harm" to the parties
involved."' Finally, the court addressed the newly developed fifth factor and
considered whether the challenged forfeiture would deprive Viloski of his
livelihood.116 The evidence Viloski presented concerning his personal
circumstances was insufficient render the forfeiture disproportionate because
he made no attempt to show the forfeiture would deprive him of his
livelihood by preventing him from earning a living after released from
prison. 1 7 The Second Circuit concluded that the forfeiture imposed on
Viloski was not grossly disproportionate to the gravity of the offenses that
had been imposed.Is

IV. ANALYSIS
Punishing culpable offenders is an integral feature of the American
criminal justice system.' 19 Seizing property from individuals convicted of
specific crimes via criminal forfeiture is punishment. 12 0 The government can
seek criminal forfeiture as a prosecutorial function, but forfeiture is limited
by the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution.121 Forfeiture
does not apply in all types of cases and is not always an appropriate
punishment. 12 2 What is less clear, especially in light of the Second Circuit's
ruling in Viloski, are the guidelines for determining when criminal forfeiture
is constitutionally excessive.1 23 As a result of the Second Circuit's adoption
of a different test, the question is whether the Supreme Court implemented

forfeiture amount in question thus, suggesting Congress viewed these offenses as significant
crimes. Id. There is a strong presumption that the forfeiture is constitutional if it falls within the
guideline range. See United States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, 175 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 1999).
114 See Viloski, 814 F3d at 114 (stating fourth factor of proportionality test).
"s
See id. (affirming district court's finding).
116 See id. at 114-15 (recognizing fifth factor for proportionality determination).
1" See id. (noting absence of evidence that Viloski would be deprived of livelihood). Viloski
presented evidence regarding his age, health, and financial situation, but the court did not credit
this evidence as probative of the fifth factor. Id. at 115.
118 See id. at 115 (rejecting Viloski's constitutional attack on forfeiture).
119 See Cassella, supra note 1, at 2 (explaining reasons for forfeiture of assets).
120 See Cassella, supra note 1,. at 14 (noting criminal forfeiture is part of sentence).
121 See Cassella,supra note 1, at 8 (acknowledging forfeiture orders are constrained by Eighth
Amendment).
122 See Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, 492 U.S. 257, 260 (1989) (holding
Excessive Fines Clause does not apply to punitive damage awards between private parties); see
also United States ex rel. Tyson v. Amerigroup Ill., Inc., 488 F. Supp. 2d 719, 743 (N.D. 111. 2007)
(recognizing Excessive Fines Clause protects corporations from excessive fines).
123 See Viloski, 814 F3d at 114 (establishing new criteria to consider for forfeiture).
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the right test for analyzing the proportionality of forfeitures under the
Excessive Fines Clause.1 2 4
The test was not specific enough for other courts to use it effectively,
leaving too much discretion to the circuit courts to adapt their own tests. 25
An unpredictable test threatens to undermine the Eighth Amendment's
protection from government overreach. 1 26 The Bajakajian analysis is
unhelpful because it leaves too much discretion to the courts and prevents
attorneys from reliably predicting whether an ordered forfeiture will
withstand constitutional attack.1 27
The Viloski court was comfortable beginning its analysis by
reviewing the constitutionality of criminal forfeiture using the four-factor
test established in Bajakajian.12 8 However, the Second Circuit may be
reaching too far by adding a fifth factor to the analysis .129 The Second
Circuit's analysis changes the consideration that a court must conduct when
124 See Bajakajian,524 U.S. at 344 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (questioning majority's
opinion).
The dissent points out the potential impact of this decision:

For the first time in its history, the Court strikes down a fine as excessive under the
Eighth Amendment. The decision is disturbing both for its specific holding and for the
broader upheaval it foreshadows. At issue is a fine Congress fixed in the amount of the
currency respondent sought to smuggle or to transport without reporting. If a fine
calibrated with this accuracy fails the Court's test, its decision portends serious
disruption of a vast range of statutory fines. The Court all but says the offense is not
serious anyway. This disdain for the statute is wrong as an empirical matter and
disrespectful of the separation of powers. The irony of the case is that, in the end, it may
stand for narrowing constitutional protection rather than enhancing it. To make its
rationale work, the Court appears to remove important classes of fines from any
excessiveness inquiry at all. This, too, is unsound; and with all respect, I dissent.
Id.; see also Viloski, 814 F.3d at 110-11 (recognizing courts applying Bajakajianneither added to
factors nor described them as comprehensive); United States v. Lippert, 148 F.3d 974, 976 (8th Cir.
1998) (acknowledging Excessive Fines Clause analysis is more difficult after Bajakajiandecision).
The Bajakafian dissent argued that the majority "treats many fines as 'remedial' penalties even
though they far exceed the harm suffered ..... See Lippert, 148 F.3d at 978 (quoting Bajakajian,
524 U.S. at 344-45) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)). The dissent criticized the majority for not
considering a fine as a punishment even if the fine is much larger than the money the defendant
owes for his crimes. Id. The dissenters also criticized the majority's stance that civil penalties under
the Anti-Kickback statute could potentially not be subject to protection under the Excessive Fines
Clause because those penalties are a remedy rather than a punishment. Id.
125 See Viloski, 814 F.3d at 110 (discussing prior application of Bajakajian factors). The
Second Circuit acknowledged the primary question on appeal was whether the Bajakajian factors
are comprehensive - a question of first impression. Id.
126 See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibiting "excessive fines" and "cruel and unusual
punishments"); see also Viloski, 814 F.3d at 113 (acknowledging result will be "inherently
imprecise").
127 See Viloski, 814 F.3d at 113 (applying Bajakajianframework to ordered forfeiture).
128 See id. (beginning with four "traditional" factors outlined in Bajakajian).
129 See id. at 111 (justifying consideration of one additional factor).
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determining whether a punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment.13 0 Using a fifth factor that examines
whether the forfeiture at issue would deprive a defendant of his livelihood,
the court shifts the focus from the criminal act to the criminal wrongdoer. 13 1
When the Supreme Court first examined the issue of criminal forfeiture, it
focused on the characteristics of the offense, not the characteristics of the
offender. 1 32
Other circuits have completely disregarded the relevance of a
defendant's future ability to earn a living when determining whether criminal
forfeiture is appropriate. 3 3 In an Eleventh Circuit case, a physician
defendant who was convicted for unlawfully distributing controlled
substances argued that the forfeiture of his medical license was an excessive
fine in violation of the Eighth Amendment. 3 4 The court disregarded the
defendant's claim that his license stripped him of everything in his life and
refuted the defendant's claim by stating that most people earn a living
without a medical license."' Furthermore, the court explicitly held that it
does not consider the "personal impact of a forfeiture on the specific
defendant in determining whether the forfeiture violates the Eighth
Amendment."l 3 6 Although the defendant in that case abused his medical
license to perpetrate the crime, if the same facts are applied in the Second
Circuit the case may have had a different result because the court can
consider the defendant's future ability to earn a living.'
The Viloski court is not clear why a defendant's personal
circumstances, such as age, health, or financial situation should not be
considered when making a proportionality determination.1 38 However, the
court stated such circumstances could be considered when determining

130 See id. (adding additional factor to analysis). Viloski failed to introduce facts proving the
challenged forfeiture would deprive him of his livelihood. Id. at 114 n.17.
' See Viloski, 814 F.3d at 114 (analyzing impact of criminal forfeiture on defendant's
livelihood).
132 See generally Bajakajian, 524 U.S. at 324 (discussing details of offense involved).
133 See United States v. Dicter, 198 F.3d 1284, 1292 n.1 1 (11th Cir. 1999) (holding personal
impact of forfeiture irrelevant when determining Eighth Amendment violations).
134 See id. at 1287 (disregarding personal impact of medical license forfeiture).
"3
See id. at 1292 n.11 (dismissing relevance of medical license for livelihood).
136 See id. (reiterating insignificance of personal impact when assessing constitutionality of
forfeitures); see also United States v. 817 N.E. 29th Drive, 175 F3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 1999)
(recognizing forfeiture of residence is analyzed as not determined as "excessive" as applied to
individual).
137 See Viloski, 814 F.3d at 111-12 (balancing forfeiture with defendant's future ability to earn
living).
138 See id. at 114 (using Viloski's failure to provide strong argument for why forfeiture would
deprive him of livelihood).
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whether forfeiture would deprive a defendant of his livelihood.'3 9 It is
contradictory to emphasize the irrelevancy of the personal factors in
themselves, only to allow the court to ultimately consider the factors in
conjunction with the fifth factor.1 40 This shift in analysis leaves too much
open for interpretation when determining criminal forfeiture.141
Regardless of whether or not a defendant is ordered criminal
forfeiture, a defendant is already at severe risk of being deprived his
livelihood from a criminal conviction and remedial payment.1 42 There are
consequences of criminal convictions that are often hard to discern at the
moment of conviction.1 43 The consequences of a conviction can severely
impact an individual's future social and economic status.'4
These
consequences are often imposed at the discretion of state and federal
agencies independent of the court system.1 45 Such consequences consist of
"temporary or permanent ineligibility for public benefits, public or
government-assisted housing, and federal student aid; various employmentrelated restrictions; disqualification from military service; civic
disqualifications such as felon disenfranchisement and ineligibility for jury
service; and, for non-citizens, deportation."'" Even when people fully
rehabilitate, they may face countless barriers reintegrating into society.1 47
These barriers may be accompanied by stigmatization.1 48
The Viloski court focused more on Viloski's failure to present
evidence to support his claim, rather than certain personal factors that would
impact his ability to earn a future living .149 There may have been a different

See id. at 115 (citing factors "irrelevant in themselves").
See id. (opining factors "irrelevant" but considering them in conjunction with challenged
forfeiture).
141 See id. (leaving factors unclear for future courts analysis).
142 See Cameron H. Holmes, ForfeitureAchieves ProperPurposes by AppropriateMeans, 39
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 335, 348 (1994) ("Punishment of any person simply has no place in the
application of these remedial forfeitures."); see also Michael Pinard, An Integrated Perspective on
the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry Issues Faced by Formerly
IncarceratedIndividuals,86 B.U.L. REV. 623,634-39 (2006) (discussing consequences of criminal
convictions).
143 See Pinard, supra note 142, at 634-39 (discussing consequences of criminal convictions).
'4
See Pinard,supra note 142, at 634-35 (emphasizing scope of consequences).
145 See Pinard, supra note 142, at 634-35 (explaining how consequences may attach
"automatically upon the conviction by operation of law.").
146 See Pinard, supra note 142, at 635-36 (discussing monetary and social impacts).
147 See David J. Norman, Stymied by the Stigma of a Criminal Conviction: Connecticut and
the Struggle to Relieve Collateral Consequences, 31 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 985, 991 (2013)
(examining stigma associated with post-conviction difficulties).
148 See id. at 990-91 (discussing reality of stigma attached).
149 See Viloski, 814 F.3d at 114 & n.17 ("Viloski has adduced no facts at all suggesting that
the challenged forfeiture would deprive him of his livelihood .... .").
''

140
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result if Viloski had a more compelling argument or was able to present more
facts showing the forfeiture would deprive him of his livelihood. 50
Therefore, the court should focus more on explaining how the analysis of
5
personal factors could affect an excessive fines case.1 1
Age is commonly a factor when determining the punishment for a
defendant.1 52 Courts historically punish younger defendants or juveniles less
severely so they can rehabilitate and create a future life.1 53 At sixty-five years
old, Viloski could not argue rehabilitation or that he had his whole life ahead
of him.' 54 The court may have looked at this situation differently had Viloski
been younger. 55 If a court is allowed to consider youthfulness as a
mitigating factor, the court should also consider a defendant's older age and
a life without committing crime as a mitigating factor.15 6

150 See id. at 114 (holding Viloski presented no evidence suggesting he would be deprived of
his livelihood).
151 See id. at 115 (citing factors as "irrelevant in themselves.").
152 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574 (2005) (analyzing differences between adults
and juveniles). The Court found three reasons juveniles should be categorically less culpable than
adults: (1) "lack of maturity and an underdeveloped sense of responsibility"; (2) "more vulnerable
or susceptible to negative influences and outside pressures"; and (3) "character of a juvenile is not
as well formed as that of an adult." Id. at 569-70 (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 U.S. 350, 367
(1993)) (citing Eddings v. Okla., 455 U.S. 104, 115-16 (1981)); See also Barry C. Feld,
Symposium: "YOUTH MATTERS: MILLER V. ALABAMA AND THE FUTURE OF
JUVENILE SENTENCING": Guest Editor John F. Stinneford: The Youth Discount: Old Enough
to Do the Crime, Too Young to Do the Time, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 107, 135 (2013) (discussing
relevance of age). "[T]he Supreme Court applied the Eighth Amendment to the entire category of
juvenile offenders ... and required states to consider youthfulness as a mitigating factor in
sentencing." Id. at 107. States are prohibited from executing juveniles. Id. Generally, there is a
societal understanding that a person is no longer a child once he or she turns eighteen.
153 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (acknowledging majority of states have
rejected imposing death penalty on juveniles).
154 Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 3, United States v. Viloski, 814 F.3d 104, No. 5:09-CR00418-02 (2d Cir. 2016) (considering Viloski's older age as less compelling factor).
155 See Feld, supra note 152, at 139 (explaining youthfulness as factor). The Model Penal
Code sentencing provisions state when an offender commits a crime before the age of eighteen,
"the offender's age shall be a mitigating factor, to be assigned greater weight for offenders of
younger ages." Id. at 144-45 (quoting Model Penal Code § 6.11(a)). The Model Penal Code
recommends younger offenders get priority for "rehabilitation and reintegration into the lawabiding community" and judges have the ability to commit juveniles to programs instead of giving
prison sentences. Id. at 145 (quoting Model Penal Code § 6.11(b) and (d)).
156 See id. at 144-45 (explaining that youths have better chance to absolve their mistakes); IV.
SENTENCING, 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PRoc. 721, 743 (2012) (examining Sentencing
Guidelines and Sentencing Reform Act of 1984). Under the Sentencing Guidelines, career
offenders are assigned the highest criminal history guideline. Id. at 749. An individual is labeled a
career offender if the following are met:

(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the time of the instant offense; (2) the
instant offense is a felony that is a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense;
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'

The facts are undisputed that Viloski was in poor health. 15 7
However, the courts view on health as a mitigating factor is unclear even
though poor health can deprive a defendant from earning a living.5 8 Courts
have used their discretion in considering poor health when making rulings. 5 9
Maybe the reasoning is that if an individual pays a criminal forfeiture fine,
he would not have the means to pay for medical expenses.160 Regardless,
there seems to be a disconnect between health and future livelihood. 6
Additionally, the financial situation of a defendant ordered to pay a
criminal forfeiture should be relevant in determining if the defendant would
be deprived of his livelihood.1 62 In another Eleventh Circuit case, the court
noted that the potential impact of forfeiture on a defendant's finances is not
a factor to be considered. 16 3 A defendant who is ordered to forfeit money is
directly financially impacted by that ordered payment.'6 Although Viloski
argued that he does not have the means to pay the money back, the court has
measures for situations where a defendant does not have the money to pay
back remedial damages, including seizing future assets. 165
and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions of either a crime of
violence or a controlled substance offense.
Id.
117 See Viloski, 53 F. Supp. 3d at 532 (determining Viloski's health and collection
of Social
Security benefits not considered). Viloski suffered from several ailments and had procedures
including a double bypass surgery with post-surgery complications and a cancer diagnosis. Id.
15 See id. (noting Viloski's poor health but not explaining
relevance).
159 See Demonstratinginability to pay, 48A NY Jur 2d Domestic Relations § 2818 (database
updated Feb. 2017) (noting party's poor health as factor to be considered on motion to punish for
contempt). Another consideration in New York is the defaulting party's use of money for other
legitimate expenses, such as paying college tuition. Id. However, the court should not consider
inability to pay if the reason is something negative, such as habitual drinking, or if an individual is
seeking to cheat the system by transferring property to a child. Id. Also, the inability to pay will
usually not be recognized as a defense if the individual's loss of employment was willful. Id.
160 See Viloski, 53 F. Supp. at 532 ("Moreover, as set forth in the financial status affidavit
accompanying defendant's memorandum, as a direct result of his conviction, incarceration, and
costs of his defense, defendant contends he has no assets with which to pay any forfeiture, and there
is little prospect that he will be able to pay any forfeiture amount in the future considering his age,
poor health, and physical and civic disabilities.").
161 See Viloski, 814 F.3d at 115 (listing personal factors
including health).
162 See id. (including financial situation as relevant personal factor).
163 See United States v. Finazzo, No. 10-CD-457 (RRM) (RML), 2014 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS
114430, at * 114 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 1, 2014) (noting factors court is not allowed to consider).
16 See Brief of Petitioner-Appellant at 6, United States v. Viloski, 814 F3d 104, No. 5:09CR-00418-02 (2d Cir. 2016) (arguing person's health and financial situation affect ability to earn
living).
165 See Viloski, 814 F.3d at 108 (citing Viloski's inability to pay forfeiture ordered by court);
see also United States v. Fogg, 666 F.3d 13, 18 (1st Cir. 2011) (basing forfeiture decision on
defendant's inability to pay). "[A] defendant's inability to satisfy a forfeiture at the time of
conviction, in and of itself, is not at all sufficient to render a forfeiture unconstitutional nor is it
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The Viloski court continually cites the three personal factors as age,
health, and financial circumstances as relevant factors for determining
criminal forfeiture, but leaves open the possibility that other personal
circumstances can be considered. 16 6 For instance, the profession of the
defendant is a personal factor that may impact the defendant's livelihood and
the ability to get a job in the future.1 6 7 Another factor can be whether the
defendant has to provide for his family.16 1 Since many of the personal factors
are intertwined with each other, such factors can be challenging to
separate .169
V. CONCLUSION
The Austin and Bajakajiancases heard by the Supreme Court of the
United States are landmark decisions impacting the applicability of the
Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment to the United States
Constitution. The cases expanded the use of the Excessive Fines Clause,
allowing defendants to challenge not only the proportionality of civil
forfeitures, but also the constitutionality of criminal forfeitures. The
decisions in these cases established the constitutionality of forfeitures and
laid the groundwork for the Excessive Fines Clause analysis which the
Viloski court applied in a criminal forfeiture action.
As determined in Viloski, when the Second Circuit is deciding
whether an ordered criminal forfeiture is grossly disproportionate to a crime,
a court must analyze whether the forfeited property is an "instrumentality"
of the crime committed, and then if the property's value is propositional to
its owner's culpability. The court must then analyze the criminal forfeiture
using the Bajakajianfour-factor test. The four factors are: (1) the essence of
the crime of the defendant and its relation to other criminal activity; (2)
whether the defendant fits into the class of persons for whom the statute was
even the correct inquiry." See Fogg, 666 F.3d at 20 (quoting United States v. Levesque, 546 F.3d
78, 85 (1st Cir. 2008)). A monetary judgment allows the government to collect on a forfeiture order
in the "same way that a successful plaintiff collects a money judgment from a civil defendant[,] ...
even if a defendant does not have sufficient funds to cover the forfeiture at the time of conviction,
the government may seize future assets to satisfy the order." Id. at 20.
166 See Viloski, 814 F.3d at 115 (citing factors as relevant only when in conjunction with
forfeiture).
167 See In re Disbarment of Viloski, 566 U.S. 1033, 1 (2012) (entering Viloski's order for
disbarment). Viloski was an attorney and had to forfeit his bar license. Id. Therefore, he could no
longer could work in the profession he kept for most of his adult life. Id.
168 See Viloski, 814 F.3d at 110 (considering additional responsibility to provide for family).
The main issue on appeal was a question of first impression which analyzed whether the factors are
exhaustive. Id.
169 See id. (noting connectedness of factors).
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principally designed; (3) the maximum sentence and fine that could have
been imposed; and (4) the nature of the defendant's harm.
As part of the proportionality analysis developed by the Bajakajian
Court, the Viloski court held that the constitutionality of a criminal forfeiture
may also be determined by analyzing the circumstances under an additional
fifth factor. The fifth factor expanded the analysis by examining whether the
forfeiture would deprive the defendant of his future ability to earn a living.
However, the court was not allowed to consider as a discrete factor, whether
a defendant's personal circumstances, including age, health, and financial
situation would be impacted by the criminal forfeiture. The ruling by the
Second Circuit creates too much uncertainty by expanding the grossly
disproportional analysis. The Second Circuit expanded the Bajakajianfourfactor analysis, but did not provide guidance on how to apply the new factor.
Gregoire Ucuz

